

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 EUR-12 EA-10 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3063

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: NPT REVCON: US STATEMENT ON STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY
OF NNWS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED BY US REP
(KLEIN) IN FIRST COMMITTEE MAY 20:

QUOTE: MR CHAIRMAN, THE QUESTION OF STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES HAS BEEN A MAJOR AND RECURRING THEME OF OUR DELIBERATIONS. A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THAT OBJECTIVE, NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT -- APPLICABLE UNIVERSALLY -- NOT TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, SEVERAL SPEAKERS AT THIS CONFERENCE HAVE MADE REFERENCE TO THE WIDE DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST IN THE SECURITY SITUATIONS OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THESE DIFFERENCES COMPLICATE ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE SECURITY GUARANTEES ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS. WE ALSO DOUBT THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVISE AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD NEGATIVE ASSURANCE FORMULATION THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY SERVE THE VARIED SECURITY NEEDS OF THE DIVERSE GROUP OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES THAT ARE PARTY TO THE NPT.

MANY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, IN EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, HAVE ENTERED INTO SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING ASSISTANCE IN DETERRING AND, IF NECESSARY, DEFENDING AGAINST ARMED ATTACK. SUCH RELATIONSHIPS HAVE PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE IN ALLEVIATING THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF MANY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES, AND OFTEN HAVE MADE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF ENTIRE REGIONS OF THE WORLD. INDEED, WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT SUCH RELATIONSHIPS DO HAVE A DECISIVE EFFECT IN PROVIDING A NUMBER OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WITH SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE FUFILLMENT OF THEIR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS TO FOREGO THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION.

THEREFORE, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT THAT NEGATIVE ASSURANCES OF THE TYPA PROPOSED BY SOME DELEGATION COULD HAVE ON EXISTING SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS. IN OUR UNCLASSIFIED

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VIEW, SUCH ASSURANCES COULD, IN A NUMBER OF CASES, BE SEEN AS UNDERCUTTING THE COMMITMENTS -- OR SO-CALLED "POSITIVE" ASSURANCES -- PROVIDED IN THE CONTEXT OF A MUTUAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT. THERE WOULD BE A SERIOUS RISK OF WEAKENING THE ABILITY OF ALLIANCE MEMBERS TO DETER ARMED ATTACK, AND THIS COULD RAISE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS IN THE MINDS OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE ALLIES ABOUT THEIR SECURITY. INDEED, THE PROVISION OF NON-USE ASSURANCES, RATHER THAN STRENGTHENING

THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, MIGHT HAVE THE CONTRARY EFFECT, AND IN SOME INSTANCES MIGHT INCREASE INCENTIVES FOR ACQUIRING INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SO FAR ADDRESSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEGATIVE ASSURANCES ONLY FOR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES THAT PARTICIPATE IN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THOSE NUCLEAR POWERS UNDERTAKING A NON-USE COMMITMENT. WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT MANY OTHER NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ARE NOT THE RECIPIENTS OF SPECIFIC GUARANTEES FROM ALLIES. SEVERAL OF THESE STATES PERCEIVE SERIOUS THREATS TO THEIR SECURITY, AND PRESUMABLY THESE PERCEIVED THREATS HAVE WEIGHED HEAVILY IN THE DECISION OF SOME TO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE NPT. EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO MEET THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF SUCH STATES.

BUT WE MUST ASK OURSELVES WHETHER NEGATIVE ASSURANCES FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES PARTY TO THE NPT WOULD REALLY BE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ALLEVIATING THEIR GENUINE AND PRESSING CONCERNS. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD ASK WHETHER THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR ATTACK BY THE THREE NPT DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS IS REALLY THE MOST SERIOUS OR IMMEDIATE -- OR EVEN A SIGNIFICANT -- THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THESE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

IT SEEMS TO US -- ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY WE CAN NOT SPEAK FOR THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED -- THAT THE MOST PRESSING CONCERN OF THESE STATES IS OFTEN THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, AND THAT THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF SUCH CONCERN IS OFTEN NEIGHBORING NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. TO THE EXTENT THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE FEARED, IT IS OFTEN THE FEAR THAT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE RIVALS WILL DEVELOP SUCH WEAPONS. FOR THESE REASONS, WE QUESTION WHETHER A THREE-POWER NON-USE PLEDGE WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE SECURITY EQUATIONS OF A NUMBER OF NON-NUCLEAR

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WEAPON STATES THAT GENUINELY HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR SECURITY; AND WE THEREFORE DOUBT THAT SUCH A PLEDGE WOULD SERVE AS A POWERFUL INCENTIVE TO RENOUNCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THUS, IN OUR VIEW, A NON-USE UNDERTAKING APPLIED WORLDWIDE COULD INVOLVE THE RISK OF REDUCING THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE MEMBERS OF MUTUAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS, WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDING ASSURANCE THAT THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THOSE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO WHICH THE UNDERTAKING WOULD LARGELY BE ADDRESSED WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY ALLEVIATED. WE THEREFORE DO NOT BELIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF NON-PROLIFERATION OR THE GOAL OF UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO THE NPT WOULD BE WELL SERVED BY SUCH AN UNDERTAKING.

SEVERAL DELEGATIONS IN THE COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER SECURITY GUARANTEES IN THE CONTEXT OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONE ARRANGEMENTS. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THESE SUGGESTIONS IS THAT MANY OF THE FACTORS THAT COMPLICATE ANY ATTEMPT TO ARRIVE AT AN ACCEPTABLE NON-USE UNDERTAKING ON A WORLD WIDE BASIS MAY NOT BE PRESENT IN A NARROWER GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK. WE WOULD AGREE THAT, TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH OBSTACLES DO NOT EXIST IN PARTICULAR REGIONS OF THE WORLD, A NON-USE UNDERTAKING IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ARRANGEMENT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES CONCERNED. IN THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA, MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT A NON-USE COMMITMENT WOULD NOT DISTURB EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL STATES CONCERNED OR OF THE REGION GENERALLY. ACCORDINGLY, WE ADHERED TO PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF TLAHELCO WHICH, AS YOU ALL KNOW, CONTAINS A NON-USE COMMITMENT. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE, THAT EACH NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSAL MUST BE JUDGED ON ITS OWN MERITS TO DETERMINE WHETHER, GIVEN THE PARTICULAR SECURITY SITUATION PREVAILING IN THE REGION, THE PROVISION OF A NON-USE PLEDGE WOULD LIKELY TO HAVE A FAVORABLE EFFECT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IT DOES NOT SEEM VERY USEFUL OR PROMISING
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TO MY DELEGATION TO CENTER OUR ATTENTION NARROWLY ON THE QUESTION OF NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES. THE SUBJECT WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH IS BROADER THAN THAT -- IT IS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. SO LET US EXPAND OUR FOCUS AND CONSIDER PRACTICAL MEANS OF PROMOTING THIS WIDER OBJECTIVE.

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A NUMBER OF SPEAKERS HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED SEVERAL
EXISTING WAYS IN WHICH THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON
STATES CAN BE ENHANCED. ONE EXISTING MEASURE -- ONE
WHICH I HARDLY NEED TO DWELL ON IN THIS BODY -- IS THE
NPT ITSELF. MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE WILL RECALL THAT
ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVATIONS FOR THE TREATY WAS THE
DESIRE OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO ENTER INTO MUTUALLY
BINDING COMMITMENTS WITH OTHER NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES
NOT TO ENGAGE IN A PERILOUS AND EXPENSIVE COMPETITION IN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAVE, ON MANY PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, STATED THAT REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT COMPLEMENTARY ROLE IN THE EFFORT TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITIES. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN APPROPRIATE REGIONS OF THE WORLD UNDER THE NECESSARY EFFECTIVE CONDITIONS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE SECURITY OF THE STATES CONCERNED.

AS MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE ARE AWARE, AN IMPORTANT ACTION SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE NPT WAS TAKEN IN JUNE 1968 AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS. I AM REFERRING NOW TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 255 AND THE ACCOMPANYING PARALLEL DECLARATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

IN OUR VIEW, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1968 ASSURANCES IS THAT THEY REPRESENT A SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED, CONCERTED POLITICAL ACT BY THREE LEADING NUCLEAR POWERS WHICH DEMONSTRATES IN ADVANCE OF A CRISIS SITUATION THEIR COMMON INTENTION TO MAKE THE SECURITY COUNCIL EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH NUCLEAR AGGRESSION OR THREATS AGAINST NPT PARTIES. THE COMMON PURPOSE UNDERLYING THE TRIPARTITE ASSURANCES PROVIDES A MUCH FIRMER BASIS THAN PREVIOUSLY EXISTED FOR TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AND THUS CONTRIBUTES TO THE DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR THREAT OR ATTACK. AS AT LEAST ONE DELEGATION HAS POINTED OUT, THE TRIPARTITE

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ASSURANCES, BY EXPLICITLY REAFFIRMING ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, DO NOT PRECLUDE THE NUCLEAR POWERS FROM RENDERING ASSISTANCE OR TAKING ACTION IN CASE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS UNABLE TO ACT IN A TIMELY OR EFFECTIVE MANNER.

MR. CHAIRMAN, AN IMPORTANT OBSTACLE TO MORE UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IN THE NPT IS THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF LONGSTANDING DISPUTES AMONG NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN A NUMBER OF PARTS OF THE WORLD. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THESE DISPUTES COULD, IF SUCCESSFUL, MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO ALLEVIATING THE MOST SERIOUS AND IMMEDIATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF A KEY GROUP OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

YET ANOTHER APPROACH TO STRENGTHENING NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE SECURITY WAS OUTLINED BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CCD, AMBASSADOR MARTIN, ON APRIL 10TH. HE STATED OUR BELIEF THAT SUITABLE RESTRAINTS IN THE

CONVENTIONAL ARMS FIELD COULD FURTHER THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF ALL STATES. HE SUGGESTED IN THIS REGARD THAT SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REGIONAL CONVENTIONAL ARMS ARRANGEMENTS AS WELL AS TO PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT THAT COULD BE APPLICABLE ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS TO THE ACQUISITION OR TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE OUTLINED SOME POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. IT WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE, I BELIEVE, FOR THIS CONFERENCE TO EXAMINE THESE AND OTHER PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO THAT OBJECTIVE. IN CONSIDERING THE UTILITY OF ANY PROPOSALS IN THIS AREA, IT IS MY DELEGATION'S VIEW THAT WE SHOULD BE GUIDED, NOT BY ANY ABSTRACT CONCEPT CONCERNING A BALANCE OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT, BUT RATHER BY THE DESIRE TO PURSUE THOSE MEASURES THAT WOULD BE SUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE AS MEANS OF MEETING THE LEGITIMATE AND OFTEN PRESSING SECURITY CONCERNS OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. UNQUOTE. DALE

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